Armenia in comments -- Book: Ecclesiastes (tEccles) Ժողովող
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tEccles 3:1 "Everything has its time, and every purpose under the heavens its hour." The Germ. language is poor in synonyms of time. Zckler translates: Everything has its Frist ..., but by Frist we think only of a fixed term of duration, not of a period of beginning, which, though not exclusively, is yet here primarily meant; we have therefore adopted Luther's excellent translation. Certainly זמן (from זמן, cogn. סמן, signare), belonging to the more modern Heb., means a Frist (e.g., Dan 2:16) as well as a Zeitpunkt, point of time; in the Semit. (also Assyr. simmu, simanu, with ס) it is the most common designation of the idea of time. עת is abbreviated either from ענת (ועד, to determine) or from ענת (from ענה, cogn. אנה, to go towards, to meet). In the first case it stands connected with מועד on the one side, and with עדּן (from עדד, to count) on the other; in the latter case, with עונה, Exo 21:10 (perhaps also ען and ענת in כען, כּענת). It is difficult to decide this point; proportionally more, however, can be said for the original ענת (Palest.-Aram. ענתּא), as also the prep. of participation את is derived from אנת (meeting, coming together).
(Note: Vid., Orelli's work on the Heb. Synon. der Zeit u. Ewigkeit, 1871. He decides for the derivation from ועד morf ; Fleischer (Levy's Chald. W.B. II. 572) for the derivation from ענה, the higher power of אנה, whence (Arab.) inan, right time. We have, under Job 24:1, maintained the former derivation.)
The author means to say, if we have regard to the root signification of the second conception of time - (1) that everything has its fore-determined time, in which there lies both a determined point of time when it happens, and a determined period of time during which it shall continue; and (2) that every matter has a time appointed for it, or one appropriate, suitable for it. The Greeks were guided by the right feeling when they rendered זמן by χρόνος , and עת by καιρός.
Olympiodorus distinguishes too sharply when he understands the former of duration of time, and the latter of a point of time; while the state of the matter is this, that by χρόνος the idea comprehends the termini a quo and ad quem, while by καιρός it is limited to the terminus a quo. Regarding חפץ, which proceeds from the ground-idea of being inclined to, and intention, and thus, like πρᾶγμα and χρῆμα, to the general signification of design, undertaking, res gesta, res.
The illustration commences with the beginning and the ending of the life of man and (in near-lying connection of thought) of plants. Ecclesiastes 3:2 tEccles 3:6 "To seek has its time, and to lose has its time; to lay up has its time, and to throw away has its time." Vaihinger and others translate לאבּד, to give up as lost, which the Pih. signifies first as the expression of a conscious act. The older language knows it only in the stronger sense of bringing to ruin, making to perish, wasting (Pro 29:3). But in the more modern language, אבד, like the Lat. perdere, in the sense of "to lose," is the trans. to the intrans. אבד, e.g., Tahoroth; viii. 3, "if one loses (המאבּד) anything," etc.; Sifri, at Deu 24:19, "he who has lost (מאבּד) a shekel," etc. In this sense the Palest.-Aram. uses the Aphel אובד, e.g., Jer. Meza ii. 5, "the queen had lost (אובדת) her ornament." The intentional giving up, throwing away from oneself, finds its expression in להשׁ.
The following pair of contrasts refers the abandoning and preserving to articles of clothing: - Ecclesiastes 3:7 tEccles 3:10 "I saw the travail, which God gave to the children of men to fatigue themselves with it - : He hath well arranged everything beautiful in its appointed time; He hath also put eternity in their heart, so that man cannot indeed wholly search through from beginning to end the work which God accomplisheth." As at Ecc 1:14, ראיתי is here seeing in the way of research, as elsewhere, e.g., at Ecc 2:24, it is as the result of research. In Ecc 3:10 the author says that he closely considered the labour of men, and in Ecc 3:11 he states the result. It is impossible to render the word ענין everywhere by the same German (or English) word: Ecc 1:13, wearisome trouble; Ecc 2:26, business; here: Geschftigkeit, the idea is in all the three places the same, viz., an occupation which causes trouble, costs effort. What presented itself to the beholder was (1) that He (viz., God, cf. Ecc 3:10 and Ecc 3:11) has made everything beautiful in its time. The author uses יפה as synon. of טוב (Ecc 3:17); also in other languages the idea of the beautiful is gradually more and more generalized. The suffix in בּעתּו does not refer to God, but to that which is in the time; this word is = ἐν καιρῷ ιδίῳ (Symm.), at its proper time (vid., Psa 1:3; Psa 104:27; Jer 5:24, etc.), since, as with יחדּו (together with) and כּלּו (every one), the suffix is no longer thought of as such. Like יפה, בעתו as pred. conception belongs to the verb: He has made everything beautiful; He has made everything (falling out) at its appointed time. - The beauty consists in this, that what is done is not done sooner or later than it ought to be, so as to connect itself as a constituent part to the whole of God's work. The pret. עשׂה is to be also interpreted as such: He "has made," viz., in His world-plan, all things beautiful, falling out at the appointed time; for that which acquires an actual form in the course of history has a previous ideal existence in the knowledge and will of God (vid., under Isa 22:11; Isa 37:26).
That which presented itself to the beholder was - (2) the fact that He (God) had put את־העלם in their hearts (i.e., the hearts of men). Gaab and Spohn interpret 'olam in the sense of the Arab. 'ilam, knowledge, understanding; and Hitz., pointing the word accordingly עלם, translates: "He has also placed understanding in their heart, without which man," etc. The translation of אשׁר אשׁלי is not to be objected to; מבּ is, however, only seldom a conjunction, and is then to be translated by eo quod, Exo 14:11; Kg2 1:3, Kg2 1:6, Kg2 1:16, which is not appropriate here; it will thus be here also a prep., and with asher following may mean "without which," as well as "without this, that" = "besides that" (Venet. ἄνευ τοῦ ὃτι, "except that"), as frequently כּי אפס, e.g., at Amo 9:8. But that Arab. 'ilam is quite foreign to the Heb., which has no word עלם in the sense of "to rise up, to be visible, knowable," which is now also referred
(Note: Vid., Fried. Delitzsch's Assyr. Stud. (1874), p. 39. Otherwise Fleischer, who connects 'alima, "to know," with 'alam, "to conceal," so that to know = to be concealed, sunk deep, initiated in something (with ba of the obj., as sh'ar, whence shâ'ir, the poet as "one who marks").)
to for the Assyr. as the stem-word of עילם = highland. It is true Hitzig believes that he has found the Heb. עלם = wisdom, in Sir. 6:21, where there is a play on the word with נעלם, "concealed:" σοφία γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς ἐστί, καὶοὐ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ φανερά. Drusius and Eichhorn have here already taken notice of the Arab. 'ilam; but Fritzsche with right asks, "Shall this word as Heb. be regarded as traceable only here and falsely pointed only at Ecc 3:11, and shall no trace of it whatever be found in the Chald., Syr., and Rabbin.?" We have also no need of it. That Ben-Sira has etymologically investigated the word חכמה as going back to חכם, R. chap, "to be firm, shut up, dark" (vid., at Psa 10:8), is certainly very improbable, but so much the more probable (as already suggested by Drusius) that he has introduced
(Note: Grtz translates eth-ha'olam by "ignorance" (vid., Orelli, p. 83). R. Achwa in the Midrash has added here the scriptio defectiva with the remark, שהועלם וגו, "for the mysterious name of God is concealed from them.")
into חכמה, after the Aram. אכם, nigrescere, the idea of making dark. Does eth-ha'olam in this passage before us then mean "the world" (Jerome, Luther, Ewald), or "desire after the knowledge of the world" (Rashi), or "worldly-mindedness" (Gesen., Knobel)? The answer to this has been already given in my Psychol. p. 406 (2nd ed.): "In post-bibl. Heb. 'olam denotes not only 'eternity' backwards and forwards as infinite duration, but also 'the world' as that which endures for ever (αἰών, seculum); the world in this latter sense is, however, not yet known
(Note: In the Phoen. also, 'olam, down to a late period, denotes not the world, but eternity: melek 'olam, βασιλεὺς αἰώνος (αἰώνιος), seculo frugifero on a coin = the fruit-bringing 'olam (Αἰών).)
to the bibl. language, and we will thus not be able to interpret the words of Koheleth of the impulse of man to reflect on the whole world." In itself, the thought that God has placed the whole world in man's heart is not untrue: man is, indeed, a micro-cosmos, in which the macrocosmos mirrors itself (Elster), but the connection does not favour it; for the discussion does not proceed from this, that man is only a member in the great universe, and that God has given to each being its appointed place, but that in all his experience he is conditioned by time, and that in the course of history all that comes to him, according to God's world-plan, happens at its appointed time. But the idea by which that of time, את (זמן), is surpassed is not the world, but eternity, to which time is related as part is to the whole (Cicero, Inv. i. 26. 39, tempus est pars quaedam aeternitatis). The Mishna language contains, along with the meaning of world, also this older meaning of 'olam, and has formed from it an adv. עולמית, aeterne. The author means to say that God has not only assigned to each individually his appointed place in history, thereby bringing to the consciousness of man the fact of his being conditioned, but that He has also established in man an impulse leading him beyond that which is temporal toward the eternal: it lies in his nature not to be contented with the temporal, but to break through the limits which it draws around him, to escape from the bondage and the disquietude within which he is held, and amid the ceaseless changes of time to console himself by directing his thoughts to eternity.
This saying regarding the desiderium aeternitatis being planted in the heart of man, is one of the profoundest utterances of Koheleth. In fact, the impulse of man shows that his innermost wants cannot be satisfied by that which is temporal. He is a being limited by time, but as to his innermost nature he is related to eternity. That which is transient yields him no support, it carries him on like a rushing stream, and constrains him to save himself by laying hold on eternity. But it is not so much the practical as the intellectual side of this endowment and this peculiar dignity of human nature which Koheleth brings her to view.
It is not enough for man to know that everything that happens has its divinely-ordained time. There is an instinct peculiar to his nature impelling him to pass beyond this fragmentary knowledge and to comprehend eternity; but his effort is in vain, for (3) "man is unable to reach unto the work which God accomplisheth from the beginning to the end." The work of God is that which is completing itself in the history of the world, of which the life of individual men is a fragment. Of this work he says, that God has wrought it עשׂה; because, before it is wrought out in its separate "time," it is already completed in God's plan. Eternity and this work are related to each other as the accomplished and the being accomplished, they are interchangeably the πλήρωμα to each other. ימצא is potential, and the same in conception as at Ecc 8:17; Job 11:7; Job 37:23; a knowledge is meant which reaches to the object, and lays hold of it. A laying hold of this work is an impossibility, because eternity, as its name 'olam denotes, is the concealed, i.e., is both forwards and backwards immeasurable. The desiderium aeternitatis inherent in man thus remains under the sun unappeased. He would raise himself above the limits within which he is confined, and instead of being under the necessity of limiting his attention to isolated matters, gain a view of the whole of God's work which becomes manifest in time; but this all-embracing view is for him unattainable.
If Koheleth had known of a future life - which proves that as no instinct in the natural world is an allusion, so also the impulse toward the eternal, which is natural to man, is no illusion-he would have reached a better ultimatum than the following: - Ecclesiastes 3:12