Armenia in comments -- Book: Proverbs (tProv) Առակներ

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(KAD) Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch

tProv 19:1 The plur. רעים, Pro 18:24, is emphatic and equivalent to רעים רבּים. The group Pro 19:1-4 closes with a proverb which contains this catchword. The first proverb of the group comes by שׂפתיו into contact with Pro 18:20, the first proverb of the preceding group.
1 Better a poor man walking in his innocence,
Than one with perverse lips, and so a fool.
The contrast, Pro 28:6, is much clearer. But to correct this proverb in conformity with that, as Hitzig does, is unwarrantable. The Syr., indeed, translates here as there; but the Chald. assimilates this translation to the Heb. text, which Theodotion, and after him the Syro-Hexapl., renders by ὑπὲρ στρεβλόχειλον ἄφρονα. But does 1a form a contrast to 1b? Fleischer remarks: "From the contrast it appears that he who is designated in 1b must be thought of as עשׁיר" [rich]; and Ewald, "Thus early the ideas of a rich man and of a fool, or a despiser of God, are connected together." Saadia understands כסיל [a fool], after Job 31:24, of one who makes riches his כּסל [confidence]. Euchel accordingly translates: the false man, although he builds himself greatly up, viz., on his riches. But כסיל designates the intellectually slothful, in whom the flesh overweighs the mind. And the representation of the rich, which, for 1b certainly arises out of 1a, does not amalgamate with כסיל htiw , but with עקּשׁ שׂפתיו. Arama is on the right track, for he translates: the rich who distorts his mouth, for he gives to the poor suppliant a rude refusal. Better Zckler: a proud man of perverse lips and haughty demeanour. If one with haughty, scornful lips is opposed to the poor, then it is manifestly one not poor who thinks to raise himself above the poor, and haughtily looks down on him. And if it is said that, in spite of this proud demeanour, he is a fool, then this presents the figure of one proud of his wealth, who, in spite of his emptiness and nequitia, imagines that he possesses a greatness of knowledge, culture, and worth corresponding to the greatness of his riches. How much better is a poor man than such an one who walketh (vid., on תּם, vol. i, p. 79) in his innocence and simplicity, with his pure mind wholly devoted to God and to that which is good! - his poverty keeps him in humility which is capable of no malicious conduct; and this pious blameless life is of more worth than the pride of wisdom of the distinguished fool. There is in contrast to עקּשׁוּת a simplicity, ἁπλότης, of high moral worth; but, on the other side, there is also a simplicity which is worthless. This is the connecting thought which introduces the next verse. Proverbs 19:2

(KAD) Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch

tProv 19:2 2 The not-knowing of the soul is also not good,
And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray.
Fleischer renders נפשׁ as the subj. and לא־טוב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נפשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as e.g., Pro 23:2; here דּעת, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. Psa 139:14), excludes this meaning. But נפשׁ is certainly gen. subjecti; Luzzatto's "self-knowledge" is untenable, for this would require דעת נפשׁו; Meri rightly glosses נפשׁ דעת by שׂכל. After this Zckler puts Hitzig's translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אין־טוב; לא־טוב is always pred., not a substantival clause. Thus the proverb states that בלא־דעת נפשׁ is not good, and that is equivalent to היות בלא־דעת נפשׁ (for the subject to לא־טוב is frequently, as e.g., Pro 17:26; Pro 18:5, an infinitive); or also: בלא־דעת נפשׁ is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא־דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא־דעת, not בּלי דעת (בּבלי), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The גּם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on "not good," then the placing of גם first is a hyperbaton similar to that in Pro 17:26; Pro 20:11; cf. אך, Pro 17:11; רק, Pro 13:10, as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also (eo ipso) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the "also," then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining
(Note: The old interpreters and also the best Jewish interpreters mar the understanding and interpretation of the text, on the one side, by distinguishing between a nearest and a deeper meaning of Scripture (דרך נגלה and דרך נסתר); on the other by this, that they suppose an inward connection of all the proverbs, and expend useless ingenuity in searching after the connection. The former is the method especially adopted by Immanuel and Meri, the latter has most of all been used by Arama.)
the original connection of Pro 19:1 and Pro 19:2), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case גם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אץ, as Pro 28:20) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails (vid., Pro 8:36, where חטאי is the contrast to מצאי). Proverbs 19:3

(KAD) Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch

tProv 19:17 These verses we take together. But we have no other reason for making a pause at Pro 19:21, than that Pro 19:22 is analogous to Pro 19:17, and thus presents itself to us as an initial verse.
Pro 19:17
17 He lendeth to Jahve who is compassionate to the lowly,
And his bounty He requites to him.
As at Pro 14:31, חונן is part. Kal. The Masoretically exact form of the word is חונן (as ואוזל, Pro 20:14) with Mercha on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and the העמדה on the second. The Roman legal phrase, mutui datione contrahitur obligatio, serves to explain the fundamental conception of לוה, mutuo accipere, and הלוה, mutuum dare (vid., Pro 22:7). The construction, Exo 22:24, "to make any one bound as a debtor, obligare," lies at the foundation of the genitive connection 'מלוה ה (not מלוה). With 17b cf. Pro 12:14, where the subject of ישׁיב (Kerı̂) remains in the background. גמלו (not גמלּו) is here his work done in the sense of good exhibited. "Love," Hedinger once said, "is an imperishable capital, which always bears interest." And the Archbishop Walther: nam Deo dat qui dat inopibus, ipse Deus est in pauperibus. Dr. Jonas, as Dchsel relates, once gave to a poor man, and said, "Who knows when God restores it!" There Luther interposed: "As if God had not long ago given it beforehand!" This answer of Luther meets the abuse of this beautiful proverb by the covetous.
Pro 19:18
This proverb brings to view once more the pedagogic character of this Older Book of Proverbs:
Correct thy son, for yet there is hope;
But go not too far to kill him.
That כּי tahT is meant relatively, as at Pro 11:15, is seen from Job 11:18; Job 14:7; Jer 31:16.; כּי־ישׁ תּקוה is the usual expression for etemin spes est. Though a son show obstinacy, and manifest a bad disposition, yet there is hope in the training of the youth of being able to break his self-will, and to wean him from his bad disposition; therefore his education should be carried forward with rigorous exactness, but in such a way that wisdom and love regulate the measure and limits of correction: ad eum interficiendum animam ne tollas (animum ne inducas). נפשׁך is not the subject, for in that case the word would have been תּשּׁאך (Kg2 14:10). It is the object: To raise the soul to something is equivalent to, to direct his desire to it, to take delight in it. The teacher should not seek correction as the object, but only as the means; he who has a desire after it, to put the child to death in the case of his guilt, changes correction into revenge, permits himself to be driven by passion from the proper end of correction, and to be pushed beyond its limits. The lxx translates freely εἰς δὲ ὕβρις, for ὕβρις is unrestrained abuse, מוסר אכזרי as Immanuel glosses. Besides, all the ancients and also the Venet. translate המיתו as the inf. of המית. But Oetinger (for he translates: lift not thy soul to his cry, for which Euchel: let not his complaining move thy compassion) follows the derivation from המה suggested by Kimchi, Meri, and Immanuel, and preferred by Ralbag, so that המיתו after the from בּכית is equivalent to המיתו. But leaving out of view that המה means strepere, not lamentari, and that נשׂא נפשׁו means attention, not desire, Pro 23:13 points out to us a better interpretation.
Pro 19:19
Another proverb with נשׂא:
A man of excessive wrath must suffer punishment;
For if thou layest hold of it, hindering it, thou makest it only worse.
The lxx, Syr., and Targ. translate as if the words were גּבר חמה (as בּעל חמה, Pro 29:22). Theodotion, the Venet., and Luther render the Kerı̂ גּדל־; Jerome's impatiens is colourless. The Chethı̂b גרל gives no appropriate meaning. The Arab. jaril means lapidosus (whence גּורל, cf. Aram. פּסּא = ψῆφος), and Schultens translates accordingly aspere scruposus iracundiae, which is altogether after the manner of his own heavy style. Ewald translates גּרל as derived from the Arab jazyl, largus, grandis; but the possibility of the passing over of ר into ז, as maintained by Ewald and also by Hitzig, or the reverse, is physiologically undemonstrable, and is confirmed by no example worthy of mention. Rather it may be possible that the Heb. had an adj. גּרל or גּרל in the sense of stony, gravel-like, hard as gravel, but tow rather than gravel would be appropriate to חמה. Hitzig corrects גּמל חמה, "who acts in anger;" but he says שׁלּם חמה, to recompense anger, Isa 59:18; גמל חמה is without support. This correction, however, is incomparably more feasible than Bttcher's, "moderate inheritance bears expiation;" חמה = חמאה must mean not only thick [curdled] milk, but also moderation, and Bttcher finds this "sound." From all these instances one sees that גרל is an error in transcription; the Kerı̂ גּדל־חמה rightly improves it, a man is thus designated whose peculiarity it is to fall into a high degree of passionate anger (חמה גדולה, Dan 11:44): such an one has to bear ענשׁ, a fine, i.e., to compensate, for he has to pay compensation or smart-money for the injury suffered, as e.g., he who in strife with another pushes against a woman with child, so that injury befalls her, Exo 21:22. If we compare this passage with Sa2 14:6, there appears for תּצּיל the meaning of taking away of the object (whether a person or a thing) against which the passionate hothead directs himself. Therewith the meaning of ועוד תּוסף accords. The meaning is not that, הצּיל, once is not enough, but much rather must be repeated, and yet is without effect; but that one only increases and heightens the חמה thereby. It is in vain to seek to spare such a violent person the punishment into which he obstinately runs; much more advisable is it to let him rage till he ceases; violent opposition only makes the evil the greater. With כּי אם, "denn wenn" [for then], cf. Pro 2:3, "ja wenn" [yea if], and with ועוד in the conclusion, Job 14:7 (a parallelism syntactically more appropriate than Psa 139:18).
Pro 19:20
20 Hearken to counsel, and receive instruction,
That thou mayest become wise afterwards.
The rule of morals, Pro 12:15, receives here the paraenetic tone which is the keynote of the introduction chap. 1-9. Lwenstein translates: that thou mayest finally become wise. But בּאחריתך corresponds rather to our "hinfort" [posthac] than to "endlich" [finally]. He to whom the warning is directed must break with the self-willed, undisciplined ראשׁית beginning of his life, and for the future (τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ χρόνον, Pe1 4:2) become wise. The relative contrast between the two periods of life is the same as at Job 8:7.
Pro 19:21
21 Many are the thoughts in a man's heart;
But Jahve's counsel, that stands.
In תּקוּם lies, as at Isa 40:8, both: that the counsel of God (His plan of the world and of salvation) is accomplished and comes into actual fact, and that it continues. This counsel is the true reality elevated above the checkered manifoldness of human purposes, aims, and subjectivities, which penetrates and works itself out in history. The thoughts of a man thus gain unity, substance, endurance, only in so far as he subjects himself to this counsel, and makes his thoughts and actions conformable and subordinate to this counsel. Proverbs 19:22

(KAD) Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch

tProv 19:22 The series makes a new departure with a proverb regarding the poor (cf. Pro 19:17):
A man's delight is his beneficence;
And better is a poor man than a liar.
The right interpretation will be that which presses upon תּאות no strange meaning, and which places the two parts of the verse in an inner mutual relation ethically right. In any case it lies nearer to interpret תאות, in relation to man, actively than passively: that which makes man worthy of desire (Rashi), adorns and distinguishes him (Kimchi, Aben-Ezra); or, that which is desired by man, is above all things sought for (Luzzatto); and, in like manner, the Heb. meaning for חסדּו lies nearer than the Aram. (vid., Pro 14:34): the pleasure of a man is his disgrace (Ralbag). Thus Bertheau's translation: the desire of a man is his charitas, must mean: that which brings to a man true joy is to act amiably. But is that, thus generally expressed, true? And if this were the thought, how much more correctly and distinctly would it be expressed by שׂמחה לאדם עשׂות חסד (cf. Pro 21:15)! Hitzig so rightly reminded by חסדו of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men; the word ought to have been חסד to remove every trace of self-satisfaction. Hitzig therefore proposes from the lxx and the Vulgate the text-correction מתּבוּאת no, and translates, "from the revenue of a man is his kind gift;" and Ewald, who is satisfied with תּבוּאת, "the gain of a man is his pious love." The latter is more judicious: חסד (love) distributed is in reality gain (according to Pro 19:17); but 22b corresponds rather with the former: "better is he who from want does not give תבואה, than he who could give and says he has nothing." But was there then need for that καρπός of the lxx? If a poor man is better than a lord given to lying - for אישׁ with רשׁ is a man of means and position - i.e., a poor man who would give willingly, but has nothing, than that man who will not give, and therefore lies, saying that he has nothing; then 22a means that the will of a man (cf. תאות, Pro 11:23) is his doing good (vid., regarding חסד, ad Pro 3:3), i.e., is its soul and very essence. Euchel, who accordingly translates: the philanthropy of a man consists properly in his goodwill, rightly compares the Rabbinical proverb, אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שׁיתבוון, i.e., one may give more or less, it all depends on the intention, the disposition. Proverbs 19:23